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ABSTRACT 
 
We hypothesize that the cost associated with the listing decision – including the greater scrutiny of 
U.S. investors – signals the depth of the firm’s commitment to the U.S. market to potential 
business partners and employees, providing a form of bonding that is directed within the U.S.  
Firms can credibly signal their commitment to the U.S. market by listing on more prestigious 
exchanges that bring greater investor scrutiny and, especially, by listing directly rather than using 
ADRs. We find strong evidence that firms with greater sales in the U.S. and those with a greater 
proportion of their sales to the U.S. are more likely to list directly in the U.S; firms with greater 
assets in the U.S. are more likely to list directly.  With the greater scrutiny for companies that list 
on the NYSE, we expect the hypotheses to hold for the decision to list there versus elsewhere.  
With the exception of sales level in the U.S., we find evidence for the relationships described 
above hold for the decisions to list on the NYSE.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he pace of globalization of goods markets in the past 40 years has been accompanied by an even 
greater integration of financial markets.  The U.S. financial market has been particularly attractive to 
both investors and companies seeking sources of funds.  According to a 2011 report from BNY 
Mellon, over 1,500 depository receipt programs have been initiated worldwide annually from 2002 through 2010, 
with about 500 or more of them each year in the U.S.  U.S.-listed programs accounted for almost 86% of all 
depository trading value worldwide, with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ the largest markets 
for trading in the U.S.  
 
And yet, it is costly for a company to list on a U.S. exchange.  The Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) requires that many firms listing on one of the U.S. exchanges reconcile their net income and stockholders‟ 
equity using U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  As Choi and Levich (1990) show, the task of 
reconciliation is costly for foreign firms choosing to list on U.S. financial markets, so foreign firms choosing to list 
on a U.S. market must have gains to offset the costs (Solnik, 1988).  And researchers find a net gain for foreign 
firms that list in the U.S.  Sundaram and Logue (1996) find a 10% increase in value for companies that list on one of 
the two major exchanges in the U.S., while Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) find that companies cross-listing in the 
U.S. enjoy a 16.7% premium, rising to 37% for those on major U.S. exchanges.   
 
There exists a considerable literature regarding the decision of foreign firms to list in the U.S.; see Gagnon 
and Karolyi (2010).  Generally, the gains from listing in the U.S. fall into three categories: gaining access to new 
investors in a deeper capital market, signaling potential investors by submitting to the SEC and the scrutiny of U.S. 
analysts, and reducing the barriers to doing business in the U.S.  We focus on the desire to reduce barriers to doing 
business in the U.S., and how this affects the decision by a foreign firm to list directly or with  ADRs, as well as 
whether to list on a higher profile exchange.  We hypothesize that firms with greater sales in the U.S., (a greater 
market relationship), greater proportion of sales in the U.S. (a greater market focus), and greater assets in the U.S. 
(and so with public relations concerns), are more likely to list directly and on higher profile exchanges.  They do this 
T 
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in order to signal their commitment to the U.S. market to potential U.S. customers, suppliers, and employees.  We 
analyze a sample of 1207 companies that cross-listed in the U.S. in 2004 and find strong evidence to support all 
three hypotheses in regard to listing direct versus through ADRs and two out of three in regard to listing in higher 
profile exchanges.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW:  THE FOREIGN FIRM’S DECISION ON WHETHER TO LIST IN THE U.S.  
 
There are three potential sources of gain for companies listing in the U.S.  First, the most straightforward 
gain is from increased access to new investors and a deeper, more efficient financial market.  Saudagaran (1987) 
finds that listing in a foreign exchange market is more likely for a firm that is larger in comparison to its domestic 
market – and so likely to have exhausted domestic sources of funds – and for a firm that is more dependent on 
foreign sales.  Karolyi (1996) also finds evidence that foreign listing is designed to reduce a firm‟s risk associated 
with raising capital and reduce its cost of equity capital.  Finally, Pagano, Röell, and Zechner (2002) find that a 
foreign firm listing in the U.S. is more likely to be comparatively large, recently privatized, and in the high 
technology sector – and so is more likely to be seeking an additional source of funding.     
 
Second, foreign firms might take advantage of the benefits of SEC oversight, monitoring by U.S. analysts, 
and the relative strictness of U.S. laws and regulations.  In fact, Biddle and Saudagaran (1991), Saudagaran and 
Biddle (1992, 1995), and Cheung and Lee (1995) provide evidence that increasing disclosure levels in a foreign 
market reduces the likelihood that a firm will list on a foreign stock exchange.  On the other hand, U.S. laws and 
institutions can protect minority shareholders from overseas markets with comparatively poor oversight of corporate 
governance; listing in the U.S. subjects the firm to SEC and investor oversight in U.S. markets and so provides a 
bonding mechanism for the firm and increases its attractiveness to the pool of potential investors in its home 
country.  Doidge (2004) finds that non-U.S. firms listing in the U.S. possess a 43% lower voting premium than 
comparable non-U.S. firms that do not list.  Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) find that foreign firms listing on a 
major U.S. exchange have Tobin‟s q ratios 37% higher than for similar firms not listed on the major U.S. exchange, 
and that expected sales growth is valued more highly for firms listed in the U.S., especially for those from countries 
with poorer investor rights.  In both cases, they conclude that the greater transparency provided by firms listing in 
the U.S. provides a strong signal to potential investors that controlling interests plan to maximize the firm‟s value.  
Salva (2003) finds a similarly positive effect for foreign firms listing on the London exchange.  Consistent with their 
previous finding, Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2009) find that the premium for listing in the U.S. is unaffected by 
Sarbanes-Oxley.   
 
While GAAP reconciliation and SEC oversight are important, there is evidence that the informal oversight 
of investors in the U.S. markets plays a key role for companies.  Lang, Lins, and Miller, (2003) find that listing in 
the U.S. increases analyst coverage of foreign firms, and that increasing analyst coverage increases firm valuation.  
Siegel (2005) finds that SEC actions are not relevant for Mexican firms, while the evaluations of analysts do have an 
impact.  The lack of official SEC action toward firms that violate its rules may not imply SEC inaction behind the 
scenes, though it does mean that the scrutiny of the SEC or investors in the U.S. market is informal.  From Lang, 
Lins, and Miller, (2003) and Siegel (2005), we can conclude that the greater benefit of listing in the U.S. comes not 
from legal bonding, but from reputational bonding – the informal bonding that occurs from the scrutiny of investors 
in the U.S market. 
 
Finally, firms may list in an overseas market in order to reduce the barriers to doing business there.  
Saudagaran (1987) hypothesizes that “coverage by local media provides „free‟ advertising that is especially 
beneficial for producers of industrial and consumer products that would spend large sums to garner such visibility,” 
and he finds that firms with greater foreign sales are more likely to list abroad.  Saudagaran and Biddle (1995) find 
that a multinational is more likely to list in countries where it has greater sales; Mittoo (1992) finds similar results 
for Canadian firms.   
 
While it is clear that foreign firms gain from listing in the U.S. market, the determinants of how foreign 
companies choose the method of listing in the U.S. is less studied.  Firms may list directly or employ ADRs, which 
represent underlying common shares of the company in its home market and are denominated in U.S. dollars.  ADRs 
may be sponsored, in which case a firm submits its financial reports at least annually and provides the reports in 
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English.  Types 2 and 3 sponsorships allow ADRs to be listed on one of the major exchanges in the U.S., but require 
GAAP reconciliation and more detailed and frequent reporting to the SEC.   
 
The type of listing a firm selects is unlikely to affect its access to the deep pockets of the U.S. financial 
market.  We do expect that investing in a higher profile listing – which has higher fixed costs – credibly signals the 
importance that a foreign firm places on the U.S. market, and therefore affects its business relationships in the U.S.  
A firm can provide a credible commitment to the U.S. market by listing directly and by listing on the American or 
New York stock exchanges (AMEX or NYSE) rather than over the counter (OTC) on the NASDAQ.   This is the 
topic we explore next.  
 
HYPOTHESES:  THE FOREIGN FIRM’S DECISION ON HOW AND WHERE TO LIST IN THE U.S.  
 
The general question we address is how firms decide whether to undertake the additional cost of listing 
directly in the U.S. versus listing via ADRs.  While the decision-making regarding how to list in a foreign market is 
related to the decision-making in regard to whether to list, it is also likely to differ in important ways. The primary 
gain from listing in the U.S. comes from the signal conveyed when a firm undertakes the sunk cost of listing directly 
and exposes itself to greater scrutiny by U.S. investors.  The credible signal associated with listing that is more 
direct or that takes place on a more prestigious exchange will strengthen a firm‟s relationships with current and 
potential U.S. customers, suppliers, and employees.  Customers and suppliers often need to make specific 
investments in terms of their supply chain or manufacturing.  They will be more likely to make these investments, or 
increase them, when a foreign firm has undertaken the sunk cost of listing directly in the U.S. financial market.  
Employees of companies that have incurred the sunk cost of directly listing in the U.S. will be more willing to invest 
in learning and other activities to enhance company-specific productivity.  Higher quality employees who have 
alternative employment opportunities will be more likely to select companies that have signaled a longer term 
commitment to the U.S. market; those lured from other firms must be willing to undertake the likely monetary costs 
and certain psychological costs of moving to a new firm and perhaps living in a new location.  Listing in the U.S. 
provides bonding for the foreign firm, but bonding is not only a signal to potential shareholders in the firm‟s home 
market, but also to potential investors across the globe and potential business partners in the U.S.   
 
Our first hypothesis is that increasing sales in the U.S. confers a market relationship gain from listing 
directly in the U.S., and we predict that firms with greater U.S. sales will be more likely to list directly in the U.S.  
Secondly, we expect that firms with sales focused in the U.S. are more likely to value their relationships there – a 
market focus gain.  For firms of similar size, we predict that firms with a greater proportion of their sales in the U.S. 
are more likely to list directly.  The bonding gain for home shareholders does not yield either of the predictions.  
Consequently, we see them as complementing the findings of Doidge (2004) and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2004) 
that listing in the U.S. provides protection for minority investors.      
 
Third, when a company increases its assets in the U.S., whether due to a construction of new operational 
facilities from the ground up, local acquisition, or a combination of the two, political and employee goodwill are 
especially important.  Laws and political relationships – local, state, and national – become increasingly important.  
We hypothesize that for firms with greater assets in the U.S. there is a greater public relations gain from listing 
directly and signaling a long-term commitment to the U.S. market; firms with greater assets in the U.S. are more 
likely to list in the U.S. directly.  Fourth, to the extent that other firms from its home country have invested in the 
U.S. – ensuring influence from like-minded firms on laws and their implementation in the U.S. – the gains from 
directly listing are reduced.  The free rider effect leads us to predict that a firm from a country with a large stock of 
foreign direct investment is less likely to directly list in the U.S.   
 
Because we are looking at U.S. equity markets and because they are large and provide access to funds that 
may not be available in a company‟s home market, we expect that the company‟s revenues and asset size relative to 
GDP of its home country will impact its listing decision in the U.S.  As noted earlier, previous studies have found 
that companies are more likely to list abroad if their assets are large relative to their home country GDP.  We expect 
that companies that are large relative to their home market, in term of sales and total assets, are more likely to enter 
the U.S. equity market for primarily financial reasons and so are more likely to employ ADRs.  The financial focus 
effect would predict that, all else equal, firms with larger sales and assets relative to the size of their home market are 
less likely to list directly in the U.S.   
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Given the requirements to be listed on the NYSE and greater scrutiny for companies that list there, the 
relationships and hypothesized effects provided above should hold for the decision to list on the NYSE versus listing 
elsewhere. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Our initial sample consists of 1648 foreign firms in the Research Insight database for the calendar year 
2004. We obtain financial data and information on the type and location of U.S. listing, and hand collect data not 
available in Research Insight from annual reports.  After deleting inactive firms and firms for which there is no data, 
the final sample consists of 1207 firms from 53 countries. The appendix contains a list of home countries and the 
number and percentage of firms using direct listing and ADRs.  We obtain home country data on GNP and Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) from the IMF‟s International Financial Statistics.  
 
Table 1 provides a break-down of our sample firms by regions and country groupings.  A little more than 
half come from the British Commonwealth countries and as shown in Appendix A, about half that amount comes 
from Canada.  While firms from the European Union, Latin America, and Asia rely heavily on ADRs, those from 
the British Commonwealth tend to list directly.   
 
 
Table 1 
Listing and ADR use by regions and country groupings 
      Regions                               Total Number                  Firms Using ADRs 
                                           Listing in U.S.                Number                % 
European Union 306                          274  90  
British Commonwealth 616                          183  30  
Latin America 133                          123  92  
Asia 131                          120  92  
 
 
Table 2 reports selected financial and macroeconomic data for companies choosing to list in the U.S.  We 
Winsorize the data at the one and 99 percentiles to reduce the effect of outliers. Even so, the differences in means 
and medians suggest that there is a wide variance in the sizes of firms that list in the U.S., with average company 
sales at close to $8 billion and median at $2.5 billion, with mean and median sales to the U.S. coming in at fairly 
similar proportion, at almost   33% for mean and 30% for median sales to the U.S.  Both company assets and 
proportion of assets in the U.S. are dispersed, with average company assets at approximately $35 billion and the 
median at $1.4 billion; the proportion of assets in the U.S. is using mean numbers at 22%, and for median numbers 
at almost 7%.  
 
Table 2 
Selected firm level data (Winsorized to reduce the impact of outliers) 
 N Mean Median 
Company sales ($ billions) 1077 8.194 0.931 
Company sales to GNP 916 0.010 0.001 
Company U.S. sales ($billions) 724 2.546 0.201 
Proportion of sales in U.S. 698 0.336 0.300 
Company total assets ($ billions) 1078 35.468 1.454 
Company total assets to GNP 916 0.047 0.002 
Company assets in the U.S. ($ billions) 635 8.794 0.102 
 
 
We present the results of logistic regressions of the listing decision in Tables 3 and 4. Panels A and B in 
Table 3 provide estimates of the determinants of a firm‟s decision to list directly or via an ADR. Though Panel A 
addresses direct listing versus listing with Types 2 or 3 ADRs and Panel B includes Type 1 ADRs with the others, 
the results are virtually identical.  We provide four models so we can provide results with and without the regional 
dummy variables, as well as with and without company assets divided by the firm‟s home county GNP.   
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We find evidence confirming our hypothesis that increasing sales in the U.S. confers a market relationship 
gain from listing directly in the U.S., increasing the likelihood of a firm doing so.  The level of company sales in the 
U.S. is positive and highly significant for all four models.  We also find strong evidence, with positive and 
significant coefficients in all four models, confirming that firms with a greater proportion of their sales in U.S. are 
more likely to list, consistent the presence of a market focus gain.  It‟s important to note that this effect is not 
predicted by bonding for home shareholders, but is explained by the relative importance of the signal that occurs 
within the U.S.  It is interesting to note that the two variables have significant impacts when accounting for the other 
and the proportion of company sales in home country GNP.  
 
The coefficient for company total assets in the U.S. is positive and significant in all four models, while total 
FDI from a firm‟s home country is significantly negative in all four cases.  This result provides strong support for 
the public relations gain from listing directly, as well as the free rider effect that reduces the likelihood that a firm 
from a country with a large stock of foreign direct investment will directly invest.   
 
Because we are looking at U.S. equity markets and because they are large and provide access to funds that 
may not be available in a foreign company‟s home market, we expect that the company‟s revenues and asset size 
relative to GNP of its home country will impact its listing decision in the U.S.  Interestingly, we find that while sales 
relative to home country GNP is consistently significant and has the expected effect – they are less likely to list 
directly – we find that assets relative to GNP consistently shows no significant impact on the firm listing decisions.    
 
 
Table 3 
Logit results: Listing Directly versus Listing with ADRs (with p–values) 
Panel A:  Listing Directly Versus Listing with ADRs Types 2 and 3 
Dependent variable equals one if common stock issued, zero if ADR 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 2.03*** 
(0.0001) 
1.99*** 
(0.0001) 
0.77** 
(0.0236) 
0.74** 
(0.0276) 
Company Sales/GNP -212.5*** 
(0.0001) 
-195.7*** 
(0.0001) 
-162.1*** 
(0.0001) 
-151.0*** 
(0.0001) 
Company Total Assets /GNP 3.41 
(0.1679) 
 2.05 
(0.4316) 
 
Company Sales in US  
($ billions) 
0.30*** 
(0.0001) 
0.27*** 
(0.0001) 
0.23*** 
(0.0001) 
0.22*** 
(0.0001) 
Proportion of sales in US 1.40** 
(0.0122) 
1.44*** 
(0.0100) 
1.45** 
(0.0280) 
1.49** 
(0.0243) 
Company Total Assets in US  
($ billions) 
0.01** 
(0.0274) 
0.02*** 
(0.0001) 
0.01** 
(0.0193) 
0.02*** 
(0.0001) 
Total FDI in US from listing firm country  
($ billions) 
-0.0033*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0053*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0053*** 
(0.0001) 
Company from EU excluding UK   2.04*** 
(0.0006) 
2.04*** 
(0.0006) 
Company from UK or Commonwealth country   3.29*** 
(0.0001) 
3.30*** 
(0.0001) 
Company from Asia   -9.91 
(0.9942) 
-10.21 
(0.9940) 
Model Chi-Squared 188.0 186.8 240.76 240.31 
*** 1% significance level;  ** 5% significance level;  * 10% significance level  
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Table 3 continued 
Panel B: Listing Directly Versus Listing with ADRs Types 1, 2 and 3 
Dependent variable equals one if common stock issued, zero if ADR 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept 1.89*** 
(0.0001) 
1.87*** 
(0.0001) 
0.64** 
(0.0469) 
0.63** 
(0.0499) 
Company Sales/GNP -171.2*** 
(0.0001) 
-162.0*** 
(0.0001) 
-131.3*** 
(0.0001) 
-125.8*** 
(0.0001) 
Company Total Assets /GNP 2.17 
(0.3982) 
 1.11 
(0.6725) 
 
Company Sales in US  
($ billions) 
0.24*** 
(0.0001) 
0.23*** 
(0.0001) 
0.19*** 
(0.0001) 
0.18*** 
(0.0001) 
Proportion of sales in US 1.54*** 
(0.0034) 
1.56*** 
(0.0030) 
1.47** 
(0.0202) 
1.48** 
(0.0188) 
Company Total Assets in US  
($ billions) 
0.01** 
(0.0293) 
0.02*** 
(0.0001) 
0.01** 
(0.0147) 
0.02*** 
(0.0001) 
Total FDI in US from listing firm country ($ 
billions) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0032*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0052*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0052*** 
(0.0001) 
Company from EU excluding UK   2.08*** 
(0.0002) 
2.09*** 
(0.0002) 
Company from UK or Commonwealth country   3.33*** 
(0.0001) 
3.34*** 
(0.0001) 
Company from Asia   -15.17 
(0.9862) 
-15.14 
(0.9863) 
Model Chi-Squared 195.70 195.21 259.36 259.21 
*** 1% significance level;  ** 5% significance level;  * 10% significance level  
 
 
Table 4 
Logit results: Listing on the NYSE versus Other Exchanges (with p-values) 
Dependent variable equals one if listed on NYSE, zero if elsewhere 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Intercept -0.67*** 
(0.0040) 
-0.59** 
(0.0109) 
-0.67** 
(0.0127) 
-0.53** 
(0.0420) 
Company Sales/GNP -6.67 
(0.6570) 
17.73 
(0.1296) 
-16.78 
(0.3025) 
10.47 
(0.3556) 
Company Total Assets /GNP 18.70* 
(0.0790) 
 24.17* 
(0.0686) 
 
Company Sales in US  
($ billions) 
0.01 
(0.9030) 
-0.04 
(0.6055) 
0.02 
(0.8561) 
-0.04 
(0.6617) 
Proportion of sales in US -0.78* 
(0.0644) 
-0.92** 
(0.0272) 
-0.74* 
(0.0832) 
-0.88** 
(0.0374) 
Company Total Assets in US  
($ billions) 
0.34*** 
(0.0017) 
0.41*** 
(0.0002) 
0.33*** 
(0.0030) 
0.41*** 
(0.0002) 
Total FDI in US from listing firm country ($ 
billions) 
0.0004* 
(0.0960) 
0.0005* 
(0.0758) 
0.0005 
(0.1087) 
0.0006* 
(0.0705) 
Company from EU excluding UK   0.85* 
(0.0815) 
0.70 
(0.1403) 
Company from UK or Commonwealth country   -0.16 
(0.6224) 
-0.25 
(0.4345) 
Company from Asia   -0.77 
(0.5329) 
0.23 
(0.8332) 
Model Chi-Squared 90.74 86.34 96.57 90.98 
*** 1% significance level;  ** 5% significance level;  * 10% significance level  
 
 
The arguments with regard to the decision of foreign firms to list directly or with ADRs should hold for the 
decisions regarding whether to list on the NYSE versus elsewhere.  Our results are provided in Table 4.  We find 
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significant statistical support for the importance of proportion of sales in the U.S., the market focus hypothesis, and 
the level of assets in the U.S., the public relations hypothesis in all four models.  We find weak support for the free 
rider effect; the total FDI in the U.S. from the firm‟s home country is significant at the 10% level in three of the four 
models, insignificant in one.  We find that the level of sales in the U.S. does not have an impact on the likelihood 
that a firm lists on the NYSE (nor does the level of company sales relative the firm‟s home country GNP).  This may 
be explained by the NASDAQ‟s recent importance for newer and more-technologically oriented firms, which will 
likely have lower home sales and greater overseas and U.S. sales. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Our results indicate that commitment signals are important in determining decisions regarding how and 
where firms list in the U.S.  The cost associated with the listing decision – including the greater scrutiny of U.S. 
investors – signals the depth of the firm‟s commitment to the U.S. market to potential business partners and 
employees, providing a form of bonding that is directed within the U.S.  Firms can credibly signal their greater 
commitment to the U.S. market by listing on more prestigious exchanges that bring greater investor scrutiny and, 
especially, by listing directly rather than using ADRs.  
 
We find strong support for the hypotheses that firms with a greater level of sales and those with a greater 
proportion of their sales to the U.S. are more likely to list directly in the U.S.  The evidence also supports the 
hypothesis that firms with greater assets in the U.S. are more likely, for public relations and political reasons, to list 
directly in the U.S.  With the greater scrutiny for companies that list on the NYSE, we expect the hypotheses to hold 
for the decision to list on the NYSE versus elsewhere.  With the exception of the sales level in the U.S., we find 
evidence for each of the relationships described above for the decisions of firms to list on the NYSE versus lower 
profile exchanges. We interpret the results as complementing the findings of Doidge (2004) and Doidge, Karolyi, 
and Stulz (2004) that listing in the U.S. provides protection for minority investors.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Data Distribution by Country 
Country Number of observations Number of ADRs Percentage ADRs 
Antigua 2 0 0% 
Argentina 14 13 93 
Australia  26 24 92 
Austria 1 1 100 
Bahamas 3 0 0 
Belgium 3 1 33 
Belize 1 0 0 
Bermuda 65 5 8 
Brazil 45 45 100 
British Virgin Islands 16 0 0 
Canada 321 0 0 
Cayman Islands 33 11 33 
Chile 22 21 95 
China 14 14 100 
Colombia 1 1 100 
Denmark 6 5 83 
Dominican Republic 1 1 100 
Finland 4 4 100 
France 43 43 100 
Germany 30 28 93 
Greece 5 5 100 
Hong Kong 12 10 83 
Hungary 1 1 100 
India 17 17 100 
Indonesia 2 2 100 
Ireland 13 13 100 
Israel 92 8 9 
Italy 12 12 100 
Japan 46 44 96 
Liberia 5 0 0 
Luxembourg 13 8 62 
Marshall Islands 6 0 0 
Mexico 43 40 93 
Netherlands 43 28 65 
Netherlands Antilles 8 0 0 
New Zealand 1 1 100 
Norway 8 8 100 
Panama 4 0 0 
Papua New Guinea 1 1 100 
Peru 1 1 100 
Philippines 4 3 75 
Portugal 2 2 100 
Russia 14 14 100 
Singapore 11 6 55 
South Africa 14 13 93 
South Korea 13 12 92 
Spain 9 8 89 
Sweden 14 12 86 
Switzerland 21 19 90 
Taiwan 11 11 100 
Turkey 1 1 100 
United Kingdom 107 103 96 
Venezuela 2 2 100 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – December 2011 Volume 10, Number 12 
116 © 2011 The Clute Institute 
NOTES 
